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Abstract 
The political role of religious value systems poses a great challenge in the perspective of 
safeguarding women’s citizenship rights. This applies to all the contexts where religious law 
defines civil, political and social rights and obligations in a manner that systematically 
promotes differential treatment of women and men, girls and boys. It also applies within the 
framework of secular laws that protect religious freedom such that discrimination becomes a 
religious group right. My concern in this article is with the limits to equal citizenship that this 
latter kind of religious accommodation may pose. I discuss some well known commonalities 
between claims to group accommodation which follow from multiculturalism’s minority 
rights reasoning, and claims to accommodation which, quite independent of “minority”-
“majority” statuses,  follow from interpretations of the right to freedom of religion. Such 
accommodations are of particular relevance to the Norwegian state / religion regime, which 
forms the “case” under discussion here.  One specific aspect of citizenship is thus in focus: 
The contestations over the legal protection of women’s rights to non discrimination, when 
confronted with the protection of the right to religious freedom. 
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 Introduction. 
Questions about the political role of religions tend to                                                                                       
bring debates about gender justice and equal citizenship, in terms of status, participation, and 
belonging (cf. Siim, this volume), back to a core claim of fair laws. Globally, the political 
role of religions are at the centre of moral and political contestations,  and religious based 
denial of women’s equality rights is a topic of heated controversy in all international human 
rights forums. One important strand of feminist concern with religion is tied to the 
citizenship status which might follow from particular accommodation politics. The problem 
has been coined in general terms by Aylet Shachar as a paradox of multicultural 
vulnerability: Multiculturalism would actually present a threat to  citizenship if pro-identity 
group policies, aimed at levelling the playing field among minority groups and the larger 
society, systematically allow the maltreatment of certain categories of group members, such 
as women, effectively annulling their citizenship status. (Shachar 1999:88) 
 
The umbrella of multiculturalism, or more precisely here, the defense for minority rights, 
covers features which go beyond the “familiar set of common civil and political rights of 
individual citizenship which are protected in all liberal democracies”, Will Kymlicka and 
Norman Wayne state (2000:2). Minority rights expand these “familiar” notions of citizenship 
through a legal recognition of the distinctive identities and needs of (ethno-)cultural groups. 
The paradox of multicultural vulnerability occurs as the simple fact that individuals inside 
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the group can be injured by the very reforms that are designed to promote their status as 
group members in the accommodating state (Shachar 1999). 
 
There are interesting commonalities between  accommodations which might follow from 
multiculturalism’s “new” minority rights reasoning, and  accommodations which might 
follow from more “familiar” reasoning about the right to religious freedom. In particular, 
these concern accommodation policies which grant some form of institutional autonomy to 
religiously defined groups.   In Martha Nussbaum’s  observation,  liberal democracies 
typically hold the protection of religious freedom to be “among the most important functions 
of government” (2002:168). In liberal state- religion orders, the right to protection 
remarkably often  translates into a claim for due respect for religious doctrines and customs 
and consequent group claims for   rule-based non-interference from the state. Quite 
independent of “minority”-“majority” statuses, religious freedom is here understood as 
containing not only individual rights but corresponding  group rights.  Religious groups may 
thus be granted exemption from general laws against gender discrimination. A formalized 
duty for the gender equality principle to yield is imposed by the accommodating (secular) 
state, which this way accepts that (groups of) women have unequal citizenship rights.  
 
Discussing dilemmas of “minorities within minorities”, Anne Phillips (2005:121) 
distinguishes between three forms of multicultural accommodation policies: extensions, 
exemptions and autonomy. “Extensions” covers policies which extend to other cultural 
groups “privileges” previously enjoyed only by members of the majority or dominant culture 
– for example, extending a principle of state support for denominational schools to include 
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religions associated with more recent migrants. “Exemptions” covers policies which exclude 
members of particular groups from requirements that are legally binding on other citizens – 
for example, allowing types of religious dress which breach with formal dress regulations. 
“Autonomy” covers policies where cultural communities retain authority in the regulation of 
certain aspects of property or family affairs, and citizens may come under different 
jurisdictions depending on their religious or cultural attachments. This is, Phillips notes, the 
category that has been thought to throw up the hardest cases, when resulting regulations put 
women at a disadvantage in relation to men (2005:121).  
 
Yet both extension and exemption policies may also provide, or lead to, more or less limited 
forms of group based autonomy.   
Consider the citizenship regime (cf. Leibert, this volume) at work in Norway. Here the 
Gender Equality Act (1978) applies to all areas of society, with an explicit general exemption 
for the internal affairs of communities of faith (§ 2). In a new chapter on equality in working 
life in the Act relating to Worker Protection and Working Environment (2004), religious 
communities are correspondingly exempted from the general ban on discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation. And in a new law prohibiting ethnical and religiously based 
discrimination (2005), corresponding exemption rules accommodate religious practices. The 
right to discriminate for communities of faith is broadening in scope, modeled on the 
exemption  in the Gender Equality Act, and institutionalized as a permanent right. Religious 
communities may discriminate as long as such discrimination is rooted in religious belief.  
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“The judicial approach” to dilemmas of gender /culture/religion often overcharges actual 
dilemmas, Anne Phillips claims (2005).The judicial approach tends to treat (any) equality 
problem as related to fundamentally opposed principles of justice and fundamentally 
different value systems. But in many cases, there is no deep disagreement; no fundamentally 
opposed understandings of justice that have to be weighed, or balanced. When political 
theory engages with these dilemmas, hard cases are sometimes made harder than they are, in 
order to highlight the resolution (2005:116).  
 
Formal exemptions from bans on discrimination, or - more generally stated -  formal 
hierarchies of legal protection, constitute hard cases in their own right.. In Norway, the 
principal right to freedom from discrimination is not granted the same formal  status 
protection as the principal right to religious freedom  The Norwegian Constitution both 
privileges an official state religion and protects religious freedom, in one and the same 
article, which first establishes the right to free exercise of religion for all (§ 2 of the 
Constitution) and then states that the Evangelical-Lutheran religion shall remain the official 
religion of the State. i Corresponding rights to freedom from gender-based discrimination, 
ethnic discrimination or discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation are not, however, 
guaranteed by the Constitution, apart from the addition of an amendment (1994) establishing 
that it is the responsibility of the authorities of the State to respect and ensure human rights.  
 
This responsibility is further specified through the Human Rights Act (1999). This law 
incorporates four international human rights conventions ratified by Norway directly into 
Norwegian legislation, with precedence granted to the incorporated conventions in cases 
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when a conflict arises between these and other statutory provisions. These conventions have 
thus been given what is often referred to as “semi-constitutional” status. They integrate 
transnational norms on citizenship rights into national legislation (cf. Hobson et. al, this 
volume) in quite radical ways, although differently than through EU integration - a union 
Norway not is a formal member of.  There are, nevertheless, certain limits set, and one 
important limit is reached when it comes to women’s rights. Two major UN conventions are 
excluded from this human rights regime; ii the Convention on the elimination of all forms of 
discrimination of women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the elimination of all forms of 
racial discrimination (ICERD). The latter is instead incorporated into a new law which 
prohibits ethnic and religious discrimination, while CEDAW is incorporated into the Gender 
Equality Act. No precedence clause applies for these conventions. When a conflict arises 
between CEDAW / ICERD protection and human rights’ guarantees that are secured in the 
Human Rights Act, CEDAW / ICERD guarantees will probably have to yield. This is the 
formal legal hierarchy of human rights conventions in Norwegian law (Høstmælingen 2005, 
Holst and Skjeie 2005, Smith 2005), and sidestepping this ranking is hard to envision.  
 
There is then, an enduring tension between the principles of gender equality and of religious 
freedom, here understood as a right to theologically based discrimination. This is shown in 
reasoning about religious accommodation, in legal weighing of human rights guarantees and 
in political legislative decision making. In this article, these issues are approached in two 
different ways.  Firstly, as regards reasoning about religious accommodation, I  revisit the 
debate over Susan Moller Okin’s essay from the late 1990s: Is multiculturalism bad for 
women? Of central interest here is a particular controversy, between Martha  Nussbaum and 
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Cass Sunstein (Coen, Howard and Nussbaum 1999),  as to how legal protection against 
gender discrimination should apply to religious communities. Nussbaum here provides what I 
regard as a standard defence for exemption rights, and I discuss how this defence also 
operates in the Norwegian context of religious exemption rights.  
 
Secondly, I discuss how the relationship between religion and equality is treated and disputes 
about  citizenship rights are resolved in Norwegian law . This discussion addresses 
prioritizing of religious freedom in constitutional guarantees,  human rights legislation and 
the Gender Equality Act. While this legislation forms “the case” under discussion, I hope that 
the major points raised will be of general interest. This hope also motivates the final part of 
the article, which investigates actual legal and political interventions that question the current 
citizenship regime and point to alternatives. 
 
 Should protection against gender discrimination encompass religious communities? 
Simply put, the purpose of CEDAW is to challenge the numerous variations of  religious, 
cultural and socio-economic structures that are based on an assumption that women are 
inherently subordinate to men. By ratifying this convention, states commit themselves to 
implementing a series of measures to end discrimination against women in all forms, 
including incorporating the principle of equality of men and women into their legal systems, 
prohibiting all discrimination against women, and taking all appropriate measures to 
eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organisation or enterprise.  
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CEDAW makes no exemption for religiously founded discrimination. The Convention’s civil 
rights provisions are at odds with sharia regimes when they state that women shall be 
accorded legal capacity identical to that of men, shall have equal rights to conclude contracts 
and to administer property, shall be treated equally in all stages of procedures in courts and 
tribunals, and shall have the same rights and responsibilities as parents in all matters relating 
to their children. Similarly, reproductive rights – sexual autonomy, health protection during 
pregnancy and birth and access to contraception – remain a source of  conflict between 
women’s rights advocates and religious states and organisations. 
  
Aylet Shachar discusses the vulnerability of women’s legal rights to equality particularly in 
relation to family law, when proponents of multicultural accommodation and minority group 
leaders alike now push for  legal reforms in the family law arena that would make the state 
adapt its institutions to reflect the cultural diversity of the citizenry (Shachar 2000:200). The 
same concern with women’s equality rights motivated Susan Moller Okin’s controversial 
essay Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (1999).  Okin’s criticism pointed  out how various 
forms of protection against “external” majority decisions simultaneously allow “internal” 
discrimination (cf. Kymlicka 1995), with examples ranging from patriarchal rules relating to 
marriage, divorce, parental responsibility, inheritance, and ownership, to religion-based 
training and education. Shachar  characterises Okin’s “simplified dichotomy” between 
promoting group-based interests and women’s rights as “misguided”, because she fails to 
address the complexities of lived experiences and multiplicities of affiliations (Shachar 
2000:201). Uma Narayan’s critique is harsher: in this text Okin constructs all “non western 
cultures” as contexts whose only salient feature is that they are “oppressive to women”, 
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whereby women of color, immigrant women, third world women, consequently are 
constructed as Prisoners , or Dupes, of their patriarchal cultures (Narayan 2205, cf. also Siim, 
this volume)  
 
Okin has answered to Shacar’s critique by pointing out that she did not dichotomize women’s 
choices as an ultimatum of “..either your culture or your rights’” (2005:70-75), but stressed  
that policies responding to the needs and claims of patriarchal cultural or religious groups in 
a less patriarchal liberal context must ensure the participation in such negotiations of the less 
powerful members of such groups (2005:72). That is, an argument about the necessity of 
democratic participation.  
 
Still, there is  little doubt that Okin’s criticism   payed almost no attention to discriminatory 
doctrines and practices in what we here might call the majorities’ religious cultures. Her 
general challenge could however be of  equal relevance to majorities. Okin asked what 
liberal multiculturalists should do when demands for group rights, respect for differences and 
internal autonomy collide with women’s right to equality. How can requirements for group-
based exemptions from general legal provisions be justified when they at the same time 
imply a violation of women’s human rights? The answer, equally simply put by Okin, is that 
they cannot. Liberal multiculturalists need to think it through again. The liberal defence for 
group-based rights is only of interest in so far as it has also assessed the internal implications 
for women, and checked to ensure that these are also justifiable. Okin’s main point is that too 
much of multiculturalist thinking has given this too little emphasis. Thus, an expanding 
normative theory has served to reproduce traditional gender blindness. And this is in spite of 
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the fact that multiculturalism’s theorists often link together “isms”, e.g. in different variants 
of “feminism and multiculturalism”. According to Okin, political advocates of 
multiculturalism must at the very least ensure that women and men are equally represented 
among the parties negotiating for recognition of a group right. In later expansions of the 
argument, Okin makes this requirement of equal democratic participation, a primary 
“resolution” means (cf. Okin 2005, above). 
 
Will Kymlicka’s response offers virtually full support for Okin’s concerns. A liberal 
approach to multiculturalism must carefully examine the potential for establishing or 
strengthening internal inequalities when discussing the legitimacy of group rights. Group 
rights that create or reinforce gender-based inequality within the group are unacceptable; a 
liberal theory of group rights cannot condone “internal restrictions” that generate injustice 
within the group. This applies to restrictions in civil and political freedoms as well as 
traditionalisation of social institutions (1999:31–33, cf. Kymlicka 1995). At the same time, 
however, Kymlicka appeals to feminism as multiculturalism’s ally in a more inclusive 
understanding of justice – an alliance that can challenge what he calls “liberal 
complacencies”.  
 
Martha Nussbaum is critical to what she calls Okin’s “contempt for religion” (1999:105). 
According to Nussbaum, Okin views religion as little more than a bundle of superstitions 
bound together for the purpose of maintaining control over women. This makes it mostly a 
practical political issue to ensure that religion does not undermine the ban on gender-based 
discrimination set out in secular legislation. Nussbaum would rather highlight religion’s 
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potential for internal change; religion as part of radical social movements and internal 
religious reform movements, as she claims is the case of the Jewish reform segment to which 
Nussbaum herself belongs. In this sense, democratic participation is a key requirement also 
for Nussbaum. But she is mainly concerned with participation “within”.  In Nussbaum’s 
view, religion can legitimately demand a special form of respect from the liberal state. From 
this, we might reason that requirements about democratic participation in “negotiations about 
group rights”, such as Okin stresses, would not be similarly prioritized by Nussbaum.   
 
Nussbaum mainly  argues in line with what Anne Phillips calls “the judicial approach”, and 
supports an interpretation of  “religious freedom” which implies that that the state cannot 
place a substantial burden on the exercise of religion unless it can at the same time claim a 
compelling interestiii in so doing. The question that must then be asked is whether protection 
against gender-based discrimination represents such a compelling interest. Nussbaum does 
not, as far as I can tell, provide a clear answer to this. As long as religious organisations are 
voluntary organisations – with “exit” possibilities – the state should limit itself to requiring 
guarantees for equal freedom and equal opportunities in fundamental areas such as bodily 
integrity, health, political equality, freedom of speech and assembly, and the opportunity to 
seek employment outside the home (1999:113-114). On important aspects of religious family 
law she is silent, but has in other contexts listed e.g. the right to marital consent and to 
divorce among compelling interests (Nussbaum2000:220).  Internal religious dogma and 
practices associated with dress codes, rituals or the choice of clerical personnel can 
legitimately claim freedom from the application of secular law. But all this is only valid in 
situations in which the members can reasonably be expected to have genuine “exit” 
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possibilities. In secular, liberal states, this will be the same for all adults. Children may need 
extra protective measures because they lack the same “exit” opportunities. 
 
Nussbaum’s discussion employs three criteria to delimit the boundaries of religious freedom: 
state interest, the religious burden, and the “exit” opportunity. Such criteria are regularly used 
in many assessments regarding how broadly the scope of religious group rights should 
extend. All three appear in a defence for “the right to discriminate” provided by the chair of 
the  Norwegian Humanist Association (Gule 2003), who supports the general exemption 
rights granted religious communities in Norwegian law. 
  
Lars Gule justifies his position on the basis of a specific type of respect for human rights 
obligations which implies a radical prioritizing of “religious freedom”. For him, the issue 
revolves around “what others have the right to do, even when humanists, feminists and 
homo-activists completely disagree in what ‘the others’ think, believe, say and do”. Freedom 
to choose a life-stance Gule portrays as “one of the oldest, most fundamental of all human 
rights”, and “gives different people and organisations the opportunity to believe and practice 
their beliefs in different ways”iv. This view is expanded upon with some comments on 
different types of violations that people may be subject to in a religious context. The way I 
understand these arguments, it is only in cases where such violations are irrevocable that the 
state should regulate religious practice. Differential treatment when it comes to job positions 
and appointments in certain organisations does not cause irreparable damage. Female 
circumcision, on the other hand, does. Circumcision of males causes too little harm to 
warrant a prohibition. More important here is that prohibiting this ritual would make it 
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impossible to be Jewish or Muslim in Norway, for instance. More generally, Gule maintains 
that psychological damage as a result of discrimination and repression in religious 
communities may be difficult to prove, and will in any case exhibit great individual variation. 
Psychological damage can therefore not comprise a general argument for protective measures 
against discrimination. The “exit” opportunity is discussed in the same light. Assuming that 
membership of a religious community is voluntary, then the individual is free to disassociate 
him- or herself from the discrimination. Women and homosexuals in discriminatory religious 
communities can utilise their “exit” opportunity and go on to start their own congregations 
and religious communities. In this manner, irreconcilable demands can be reconciled: 
religious communities have the ability to discriminate internally, while the individual can 
remove herself from that group and join another, non-discriminatory organisation.  
 
Gule’s solution thus resembles Nussbaum’s on several counts. Only “irrevocable violations” 
in “fundamental areas of life” justify state regulation of religious practices. This becomes in 
reality the decisive criterion. “Less fundamental” types of violations can be neutralised 
through the right to disassociate from them. In this blunt prescription, women’s choices are 
actually, and starkly, presented as an ultimatum of “either your religion or your rights” (cf. 
Shachar/ Okin, 2005) 
 
It is rather obvious that neither “exit” nor “voice” opportunities actually solve an acute 
discrimination problem. They simply bypass it. The “exit” opportunity, which plays an 
unquestionably central role in liberal theory regarding autonomy / subordination, thus 
represents an “easy way out” of  this principal clash between rights. Yet what “exit” thinking 
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does not contend with is firstly, what we should call an individual equal right to the exercise 
of faith, and furthermore, the fact that religious convictions stipulate obligations for peoples’ 
lives. The right to disassociate can be hard enough to practice when one’s identity and sense 
of belonging are at stake. It is at least as difficult when practical living conditions are framed 
in a context of inequality, whether in civil, political or social terms. Principally,  the very 
legitimacy of forcing an “exit option” on vulnerable group members as a way of  
(theoretically) solving “minorities within” dilemmas, is clearly questioned in gender sensitive 
analyses of this option. 
Conventionally speaking, however, space is clearly granted for religion based discrimination 
given the “exit” possibility, in popular reflections such as those expressed by Gule, in liberal 
theory concerning the relationship between the state and religion as discussed by Martha 
Nussbaum, and in actual national law making which prioritize religious group rights. 
 
Cass Sunstein ponders the relativisation of protection against discrimination in Should Sex 
Equality Law Apply to Religious Institutions? (Sunstein 1999). His answer is yes, principally 
speaking. It should apply. Relativisation of protection against discrimination takes place 
through what Sunstein calls an asymmetry thesis. According to the asymmetry thesis, it is 
unproblematic to apply ordinary civil and criminal law to religious institutions, but 
problematic to apply the law forbidding sex discrimination to those institutions (Sunstein 
1999:86). One cannot get away with murder, kidnapping or assault even if these are part of 
religious precepts or ceremonies. But there is a broad consensus regarding the limits for how 
far the scope of the ban on gender-based discrimination extends. It is uncontroversial to 
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forbid clergymen to beat women as part of a religious ceremony, but unacceptable to prohibit 
gender segregation in religious educational institutions. Can this asymmetry be defended? 
 
Sunstein discusses the justification for a “right to discriminate” as a kind of habitual defence, 
where protection against discrimination is routinely considered to be only “minorly 
important” (as opposed to “compelling”) , corresponding to the view expressed by Gule in 
his distinction between “differential treatment” vs. “circumcision”, or Nussbaum in her focus 
on “fundamental” vs. “less fundamental” areas of life. This rests upon a notion that 
differential treatment is not a particularly harmful form of discrimination. According to 
Sunstein, such a defence can in principle only work, in isolated terms, as long as 
corresponding “minorly important” bans do not encompass religious organisations and/or 
practices, which as we know, is not the case. Lots of “minorly important” laws apply without 
modification to religious communities, without mobilising demands for exemptions. What, 
then, about the other element of the defence, the “substantial burden” argument? That, too, 
says Sunstein, can be a weak argument on its own, as long as prohibitions that reach to the 
core of religious practice may actually apply uncurtailed – for instance as regards ritual 
sacrifice of animals or ritual use of narcotic substances.  In other words, general exemptions 
are difficult to defend. They maintain the right to discriminate as a “holy right”, and that is 
not acceptable in a democratic society. It should be possible to introduce a ban on gender-
based discrimination that also entails a break with established religious practices.  
Commenting on judicial balancing acts, Sunstein notes that it is probably not possible to 
avoid having to weigh concrete conflicts of interests and burdens. But in many cases the 
decision will be easy to reach. It will only be difficult to conclude in cases where a 
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compelling interest is met with a plausible claim that the interference would seriously 
jeopardize the continuing function of the relevant religion. But a liberal social order should 
prefer to deliberate difficult issues rather than to rest content with homelies about the 
legitimate autonomy of religious institutions (Sunstein 1999:93). 
 
This is a view I have no problem agreeing with. Overall, I think Sunstein’s “judicial 
approach” to interests and burdens, independent of the “exit” opportunity, is a convincing 
one. The “exit” opportunity is often employed as a form of standard phrase in liberal 
formulas of religious freedom. It borders on parody when the right to “exit” is compared to a 
form of religious shopping around, as in Gules visitation. For Martha Nussbaum, the exit 
option is clearly not to be treated light heartedly.  On the other hand, she might possibly treat 
too lightly the force of  guidelines offered by international human rights councils. In a 
weighing of the right to protection against gender discrimination and the right to religious 
freedom, the UN Human Rights Committee has explicitly rejected any interpretation of civil 
and political rights which would accept religion based infringements on the equal rights of 
women (see Loenen 2004). The general comment of the committee is entirely clear: State 
Parties must ensure that traditional, historical, religious or cultural attitudes are not used to 
justify violations of women’s right to equality before the law, and to the enjoyment of all 
Covenant rights. The protection of religious freedom may not be relied upon to justify 
discrimination against women by reference to freedom of thought, conscience and religion ( 
HRC General Comment no. 28, March 2000).  
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Habitual defences: CEDAW and the Gender Equality Act. 
This guideline is not reflected in Norwegian law. As outlined in the introduction to this 
article, religious communities in Norway maintain the option to discriminate on the basis of 
gender or sexual orientation when such discrimination is rooted in religious conviction. The 
internal affairs of religious communities are explicitly excluded from the Gender Equality 
Act. At the outset, this would imply that neither the general ban on discrimination, the 
provisions regarding the obligation of  authorities and employers to promote gender equality, 
the protective measures regarding employment, dismissal and pay equity set out in the 
Gender Equality Act, nor the provisions pertaining to equal rights to and during education, 
training and participation in associations, apply to the internal affairs of religious 
communities.  
 
The term “internal affairs” refers to matters that are closely connected to religious practice 
within the relevant community. The Gender Equality Act shall not affect the manner in 
which a religious community practices its religion, regardless of any inherently gender-
specific consequences such practice may have. This general exemption applies to the (state) 
majority as well as minority religious communities  
 
The only “exception to the exception” is the protection against sexual harassment. The 
legislators characterize harassment as an act which is not tied to/associated with the exercise 
of faith/ religion. (Ot.prp.77 2000–2001:74) This is simply declared; the basis for the 
distinction between harassment and other forms of discrimination, and their location in 
different religious doctrines/dogmas/practices, is not elaborated in the law making process. In 
 18 
all probability, however, sexual harassment is also regarded as a case of  what Nussbaum 
would classify  as a  fundamental area / compelling state interest (and then, consequently, as 
opposed to other kinds of discrimination).  
 
The Norwegian Parliament has, on the other hand, taken a particularly strong interest  in 
limiting the impact of religious doctrines in matters of marriage and divorce. Registered 
religious communities are all given formal competence to perform marriages, granted that 
they follow the procedures specified in the Marriage Act.. To combat situations where 
religious value systems still might prevent women from obtaining a religiously recognized 
divorce, Parliament in 2003 passed new legislation requiring signed statements from all 
couples about to marry, confirming that the marriage is indeed voluntary and that the spouses 
recognize the equal rights to divorce (The Marriage Act, § 7.1.) In the heated debate over this 
legislative initiative, where Muslim, Jewish and catholic communities joined in protest, no 
mention was however made of the general exemption clause in the Gender Equality Act. In 
this neglect, Parliament demonstrated its unawareness of the underlying reasons for this 
special treatment of religious communities, observers remarked (Thorbjørnsrud 2005). This 
is a clause which recognizes legal pluralism when motivated by religious belief.  
   
The general exemption clause in the Gender Equality Act has remained unchanged since the 
law was adopted at the end of the 1970s. It was not evaluated when the law underwent a 
major revision in 2000 - 2002. A Labour Party Government was in charge of the revision. 
During the review process, the Labour Party’s women’s movement had characterised the 
exemption as “legitimising discrimination”. But as the cabinet minister in charge of the 
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proposition, the leader of the women’s movement did nothing more than to state that “the 
issue would be examined in cooperation with the Norwegian Church.” The proposition 
contained no explanation of why – or how – this should be discussed with the State Church, 
why other religious communities should not be consulted, why gender equality and women’s 
human rights assessments should not be included, etc. Nor did it contain any substantial 
assessment of the relationship between religious freedom and equality in various situations 
and relations. Rather, the handling of the controversy provided a prototypical instance of 
habitual defence, in this case narrowed down to no explicitly argued defence at all.  
 
Norway ratified the CEDAW in 1981, but this had no ramifications for the exemption 
provision. The CEDAW committee, which monitors compliance with the Convention, has to 
no avail critiqued Norwegian authorities for not amending this part of the Act.  Instead the 
CEDAW convention was put on hold when Parliament passed the Human Rights Act in 1999 
(cf. the introduction to this article). And in  February 2004, a Conservative-Christian 
democratic coalition cabinet  decided not to ascribe CEDAW the same legal status as other 
human rights conventions have been given in Norwegian legislation.  In May 2005, the 
parliamentary majority confirmed this decision. The explicitly stated reason for this 
formalized first order – second order status of human rights conventions was not, however,  
the challenge posed by CEDAW to the privileged position of religion in Norwegian law. 
Rather, the cabinet cited a final report from a large scale government appointed “Power and 
Democracy study “as the prime reason behind this move (St.mld. 17 (2004-2005), cf. Ot.prp. 
33 (2004-2005), Ot.prp. 35 (2004-2005)). This report states that the Norwegian political 
system is in a process of fragmentation, where “democracy”, understood as national majority 
rule through party political representation and formal chain of governance, is in a process of 
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disintegration.  Many processes of change were interpreted as pointing in this same direction.  
In particular, however, this main conclusion  stressed an increase in legislation on citizen 
rights as contributing to a trend in which courts take control of political issues.  It directly 
addressed the human rights regime: When human rights conventions are incorporated in 
Norwegian law,  the rulings of international courts become increasingly important in defining 
the limits of national political decision making power. The report made the increasingly 
familiar claim: The expansion of legally binding human rights regimes poses a threat to 
“democracy by popular will”. (NOU 2003:19, Østerud, Engelstad and Selle 2003)  
 
As a member of the research committee appointed by the government to chair this study I 
issued a dissenting report (also published in NOU 2003:19), principally contesting the notion 
that application of international human rights conventions could be unambiguously stated  as 
a loss, or “shrinking” of democracy, and furthermore, arguing specifically for the importance 
of CEDAW in securing women’s equality rights when situations of conflicting rights 
otherwise occur. The issue of CEDAW’s formal status in Norwegian law went through an 
extensive process of review and comment. Virtually all of the institutions and agencies 
consulted during the review process in 2003 recommended that the convention be 
incorporated into the Human Rights Act. Only two were negative: the Legislation 
Department at the Ministry of Justice and the Office of the Attorney General. Both declared 
that they were deeply worried about the relationship between “judicialisation and the overall 
political room to manouvere”. In this way, the actual operation of an asymmetry thesis in 
political decision making  is also revealed: The stated objections to the incorporation of the 
CEDAW into the Human Rights Act are not based on any form of substantive evaluation of 
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the significance of the convention’s equality principles. Incorporation is instead rejected on 
the basis of general, unsubstantiated,  considerations about the danger of institutional power 
shifts.  
 
Interventions: Priesthoods and religious education  
We see how a conventional understanding of religious freedom as a kind of institutional 
autonomy justifies the exemption from the general ban on gender discrimination in Norway.  
The exemption clause does not differentiate between religious communities, and does not 
take into account the particular position of the State Church. This way, an issue of principal 
importance to the established state-religion order is simply ignored. On what precise grounds 
could autonomy be claimed in this case? An “external protection” defence (cf. Nussbaum 
1999, Kymlicka 1995) would imply that a ban on discrimination actually threatened the 
church’s existence. It seems, however, rather farfetched to invoke a special need for state 
protection of the state church’s distinctiveness and/or traditional character. The State Church 
is the institutional guardian of the official religion of the state, and the state is thereby woven 
into the fabric of the activities of the institution as a whole. This relationship is in itself 
problematic in human rights terms. Independently, it clearly  gives the state an interest in 
church affairs that in principle cannot be described as only “minorly important”. Neither can, 
in principle, the discrimination issue . This follows both from the strengthening of 
international human rights regimes and from national anti-discrimination policy, the 
argument being equally valid for gender discrimination and discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation. 
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Interestingly, in the first draft of the Gender Equality Act, which was presented in 1974, the 
State Church was not part of the planned exemption. The exemption was primarily designed 
for religious groups that in the 1970s were still called “dissenter groups.” Within the State 
Church, discrimination would be prohibited and the Act would apply with no exceptions of 
any kind. But when the draft was sent out for review, the country’s bishops, the Norwegian 
Lutheran School of Theology and the Faculty of Theology at the university mobilised a series 
of protests that ended up in the department for church affairs. In the 1970s, the ministerial 
training programme at the Norwegian Lutheran School of Theology was not open to women, 
nor was the teachers’ council interested in being forced to allow women to take part in the 
practical-theological seminar. The protests from the church were met in the sense that the 
exemption for the internal affairs of religious communities in the draft Act was expanded to 
encompass the State Church as well. But the Government was not willing to allow the 
educational institutions an exception from the general ban on discrimination. A direct 
confrontation was nonetheless avoided when the School of Theology chose, in 1977, to open 
its ministerial training programme to women. In this respect, a state initiative in clear breach 
with established religious practices (cf. Sunstein 1999), succeeded to change the internal 
rules on gender discrimination.  
 
In his official response to the suggested revision of the Gender Equality Act in 2000,  the 
Bishop of Oslo emphasised the overall importance of the Act in setting new norms for the 
Church. He argued much in line with Nussbaum’s reasoning on the importance of internal 
religious reform, but his conclusion was contrary. The bishop argued that the general 
exemption for the internal affairs of religious communities should not be maintained vis-à-vis 
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the State Church. “It is difficult to envision how the Gender Equality Act today would entail 
ramifications that principally go against the grain of the Church of Norway as a religious 
community. The equality principle must be said to be in keeping with the gospel. Justice and 
equality regardless of race, class or gender is one of the pillars of Christian teaching. Laws 
that are based on this principle must also be applied within the Church,” wrote the bishop. v . 
In this, he was clearly out of line with collegial church bodies. The leadership of the Church 
of Norway National Council has stated on several occasions that the exemtion in the Gender 
Equality Act must be maintainedvi. This is primarily out of consideration for the “minority 
within the Church” who take the view that women should not be given clerical preaching 
responsibilities. The bishop could, however, rely on the support of most women church 
leaders. In a survey where we asked whether the Gender Equality Act should apply to the 
Church of Norway, more than two thirds of the women in prominent leadership positions 
within the church answered affirmatively, while less than one third of their male colleques 
did the same. Women in leadership positions are however in a very clear minority within the 
church (Skjeie and Teigen 2003). In other words, had Okin’s “negotiation” requirements 
been fully applied to a situation where this particular group right was contemplated, the 
outcome would probably be an annulment. 
 
The Gender Equality Ombud has repeatedly asked that the general exemption provision in 
the Gender Equality Act be repealed, but to no avail. She also relies on the legal implications 
of “internal reform”. The starting point is that the legislative history of the Gender Equality 
Act explicitly states that employment of the clergy in the Church of Norway is exempted 
from the scope of the Act. At the same time, these documents indicate that the question of 
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whether an activity can be defined as belonging to the internal affairs of a religious 
community is to some degree based on discretion. If a religious community for religious 
reasons excludes women from certain rituals, the exemption provision may be invoked, states 
the Ombud. But today, there are no church-related actions that are not carried out by women. 
And the Church’s own employment regulations give women and men equal access to clerical 
positions. Discrimination can therefore not in general be said to have any “direct connection 
to the exercise of the religion” in the Church of Norway. Thus, the Ombud concludes that the 
prerequisite for assuming as a general rule that clerical appointments are encompassed by the 
exemption provision of the Gender Equality Act can no longer be said to exist. 
 
 The Ombud’s evaluation, however, also specifies how a potential religious right to 
discrimination might, in accordance with the law, be claimed as a form of (limited) group 
right. In a concrete assessment, associated with a possible appeals case, it will only be a 
congregation that may be protected by the exemption for the internal affairs of religious 
communities. In other words, it is the congregation that has to claim the right to 
discrimination; it is the congregation that must collectively believe that the employment of 
women is in conflict with the congregation’s religious convictions. In an appeals case it will 
be up to the congregation to document this. For women who are already employed in clerical 
positions in the Church of Norway, the Gender Equality Act applies in full. They are thus 
entitled to the same working conditions as their male colleagues. Male clergy who object to 
women in clerical positions cannot invoke the exemption provision of the Gender Equality 
Act when they (on their own, within their respective congregations) refuse to participate in 
church activities together with women clergy. Since it is the employer’s responsibility to 
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ensure that women in the church are not subjected to discrimination, the solution must be that 
those who object to women ministers must yieldvii.   
 
The appeals board for gender equality has dealt with only one case in which the question of 
the boundaries of religious freedom is explicitly raised. This involved religion-based 
education – an issue that in many religious communities, in various ways, regularly comes 
into conflict with the ban on discrimination. Religion-based educational discrimination may 
comprise refusing girls the right to equal education, gender-segregated forms of teaching, or 
the dissemination of gender stereotypes or doctrines of subordination through teaching . The 
case dealt with by the appeals board involved the latter – the legality of teaching materials in 
Christian private schools employing Accelerated Christian Education (ACE teaching), which 
is an educational programme utilising materials developed in American  Christian 
communities of faith (also cf. Borchgrevink 2002). In this case, the appeals board drew up a 
basis for the delimitation of religious group rights which incorporates the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the CEDAW 
in its considerations. But there was still dissent in relation to these conclusions.  
 
The Gender Equality Act stipulates that teaching materials used in schools and teaching 
institutions shall be based on gender equality. After reviewing the ACE teaching materials, 
the Ombud concluded that they were in contravention of the Act. The teaching materials in 
all subjects were predicated on religious assumptions about the subordinate role of women. 
Relevant examples were taken from the materials for tenth-grade level social studies:  
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God finished His creation, and He saw that it was good. There was just one 
exception: It was not good for Man to be alone. Man needed close fellowship with 
other people to prevent him from feeling lonely. To meet this need, God created 
Woman and wrought the Family. 
 
Other examples were taken from the fourth-grade level social studies: 
 
Multiple choice – wives shall obey their husbands – underline the best answer: 
–  Wives will be (sorry, sad, happy) to subordinate themselves to their husbands. 
– (Wives, dogs, cats) shall obey their husbands. 
– A wife obeys God when (he, she, it) obeys a husband. 
 
ACE Norway referred to the constitutional right to freedom of religion, the general 
exemption in the Gender Equality Act for the internal affairs of religious communities and 
the right of parents to raise their children within the religious belief system of their choice. 
One of the rectors submitted the following brief statement on what he regarded a proper 
hierarchy of rights in this respect: “The Gender Equality Act must be subordinate to the 
freedom of expression, the freedom of religion and the rights of parents. Anything else would 
be impossible in a democracy” (cited from Borchgrevink 2002:156). The Ombud’s decision 
was sent to the appeals board for gender equality, which provided majority and minority 
statements. The majority consisted of women, the minority of men. The majority found that 
the submissive portrayal of the wife in the ACE fourth-grade teaching materials represented a 
breach of the fundamental idea underlying the Gender Equality Act, as well as of the 
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provisions of the CEDAW concerning state obligations to prevent traditional cultural 
stereotyping. The minority maintained that the teaching materials were protected by the 
principle of religious freedom, and that this principle should weigh more heavily than the 
right to equality.  
 
Expression of religious belief: Hijab in the work place 
During the whole period that the Gender Equality Act has been in effect – that is for  25 
years - the Ombud has identified only three instances where a violation of the ban on gender 
discrimination on ethnic and minority religious grounds are claimed.viii Two of the three 
instances address hijab discrimination. ix 
 
Hijab now provides the symbolic ground for controversy raging all over Europe (see Saharso 
in this volume). In this controversy, the headscarf is made up to address a whole range of 
liberal principles: state neutrality, gender equality, religious freedom, religious diversity, 
multicultural accommodation. It is played out on a number of arenas: in schools, work 
places, public offices and courts. Court decisions on hijab prohibitions vary across Europe. 
Two complaints of hijab discrimination has been tried before the European Court on Human 
Rights. In both cases the state decisions to impose prohibition were upheld. In one case 
(Dahab v. Switzerland), concerning a teacher’s use of hijab, the court gave priority to the 
right of pupils to receive education in a religiously neutral context. In the other case (Sahin v. 
Turkey), concerning a university student’s use of hijab, the court gave priority to the role of 
the national decision making body in evaluating the necessity of a ban on the use of religious 
symbols in teaching institutions. But in both cases, the court also stressed that it found the 
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use of headscarves hard to square with the principle of gender equality – clearly interpreting 
headscarves in general as a symbol of religiously based subordination (Loenen 2004).x  In 
“Sahin v. Turkey”, the court further stressed the protection of  “the rights and freedoms of 
others”; the impact which wearing such a symbol, presented or perceived as a religious duty, 
may have on those who chose not to wear it. 
These general comments were repeated in a Grand Chamber ruling in November 2005. The 
one dissenting judge heavily criticised the majority’s treatment of hijab and gender equality. 
The court had made an unsubstantiated claim, a purely abstract weighing of  conserns: “What 
– in fact – is the connection between the ban and sexual equality? The judgement does not 
say” (http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int). The dissenting judge  characterized the “general, abstract” 
gender equality appraisals as being clearly outside the Court’s role. 
 
There can be little doubt that the European Human Rights Court’s general comments on 
headscarves and gender equality principles contribute to challenge decisions where hijab 
prohibitions, quite contrary, have been held to violate gender equality principles. In a number 
of countries, the prohibiting of headscarves in either schools or work places has been 
regarded as a form of illegal, non justifiable,  religious discrimination. In Norway, hijab bans 
in the work place have also been ruled to be in violation of the Gender Equality Act. In the 
Norwegian cases, it is the discriminatory effects of hijab bans on  women employees which 
have been at the forefront, and the individual woman’s right to non-discrimination in the 
labour market has decided the matter. No general statements on the symbolic meaning of 
Muslim head coverings, like those offered by the European Human Rights Court, have been 
presented. Like the Swedish Ombud for protection against ethnic discrimination, the 
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Norwegian Gender Equality Ombud has  regarded such general assessments as being outside 
the capacity of the office, and an inappropriate judgement of individual beliefs.   
 
One case of hijab discrimination was brought before the appeals board, which holds the 
decision power in matters of continued dispute. A large hotel in the Oslo area had practised 
an employee uniform code which the hotel management claimed was not reconcilable with 
the use of head coverings. The appeals board agreed with the Ombud in her evaluation that 
this prohibition mainly would have negative consequences for women employees using hijab. 
The uniform code – although gender neutral  in wording – produced gender specific 
discriminatory effects, and was thus in breach of the prohibition against indirect 
discrimination in the Gender Equality Act.    The hotel accordingly changed its uniform code. 
The most recent case concerns a large furniture store were the management demanded “scarf 
off” for one of the employees, again with reference to internal dress code regulations. In 
correspondence with the Ombud, the employer also stated that they established  the dress 
code from a desire to secure “value neutrality”. The Ombud, on the other hand, found that the 
business’ character and the employee’s type of work (selling furniture) to be in no particular 
need of securing spiritual value-neutrality. The ruling upheld a  hijab prohibition as illegal 
gender discrimination (Mile 2004). xi 
 
It is the use of hijab in formally non religious settings which is debated in these cases. In this 
sense, “hijab” does not construct a situation where gender discrimination follows from 
religiously motivated claims to institutional autonomy. Could there still be a “multicultural 
paradox” present in decisions which support the use of hijab? Could such rulings be seen as a 
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special protection of religious groups which in effect put (new) restrictions on women’s 
rights to equal citizenship? This is the argument made by the Human Rights Court in 
Strasbourg - or “the converse implication” drawn, if we follow the dissenting judge in Sahin 
v. Turkey. In particular, this is clear from the court’s references to the “rights and freedoms 
of others”.  In the court’s opinion, the choices of some women, who wear the headscarf, may 
put undue pressure on other women, who would prefer not to wear it. This thinking about 
“restrictions” is, at best, one sided. Another side is presented in the Norwegian Gender 
Equality Ombud’s consideration: a hijab ban would disproportionately hamper religious 
women’s employment opportunities. There is little doubt that a head scarf ban implies a 
decision not to accommodate specific religious beliefs and / or religious groups in otherwise 
non religious settings. But it does not thereby automatically imply a decision to prioritize 
gender equality.    
 
Conclusion 
My concern in this article has been with the limits to women’s equal citizenship that  
religious accommodation policies may pose. I have discussed some commonalities between 
group accommodations which follow from multiculturalism’s  minority rights reasoning, and 
group accommodations which follow from habitual reasoning about  freedom of religion. 
The article has concentrated on one aspect of democratic citizenship: the contestations over 
the legal  protection of  women’s rights to non discrimination when confronted with the 
protection of the right to religious freedom. 
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The historical traditions of major world religions have been characterised by a belief in 
hierarchically ordered, gender-specific rights and obligations. Women’s equal citizenship 
rights are challenged when current state-society orders provide general exemptions from 
general bans on gender discrimination for religious communities. Protection against 
discrimination on the basis of gender, race, culture, religion, ethnic group, or sexual 
orientation is a pillar of human rights thinking. Increasingly, international human rights 
policies are discussing parallel, and intersecting, discriminatory cultures – sexism, racism, 
homophobia – as well as collision between sets of rights in relation to religion-based rights 
and protection against gender discrimination and discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
In an important weighing of the right to protection against gender discrimination and the 
right to religious freedom, the UN Human Rights Committee has explicitly rejected any 
interpretation of civil and political rights which would accept religion based infringements on 
the equal rights of women. This requirement clearly follows from CEDAW statutes. 
 
Norwegian legislators still go a long way in the direction of conferring privilege on religious 
freedom. This can be seen in the combination of an official state religion and legally granted  
freedoms to discriminate for religious communities. Actually, the granting of formal 
exemption rights is currently broadening in scope and institutionalized as a set of permanent 
rights. New legal provisions to restrict the impact of religious value systems on women’s 
rights in marriage and divorce, could be seen to point in the opposite direction. But the actual 
political history of this provision primarily speaks of intentions to target informal legal 
pluralism, and the cultural impact of  Islamic family law. The formal expansion of general 
exemption rights in anti discrimination legislation, on the other hand, primarily seems to be 
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motivated by a will to protect the majority religion and the official State Church. But the 
political defence of religious rights to discriminate are also challenged by legal 
interpretations which for instance question the status of the Lutheran State Church as regards 
exemption rights, in particular the right to discriminate against women in clerical preaching 
positions. Also, religion-based teaching in private schools which propounds subordination of 
women is held in violation of the Gender Equality Act. At the same time, general questions 
about   internal religious subordination dogmas have been deemed irrelevant in legal readings 
of controversial hijab cases, where women employees have met employer demands of “scarf 
off”. The decisions in hijab cases in Norway simultaneously upheld women’s equal rights to 
religious expression, and to non discrimination in the work place. This line of reasoning 
represents a more gender sensitive approach than the hijab rulings recently presented by the 
European Human Rights Court in Strasbourg. In these rulings, the court itself seems to 
construct a decision situation where rights collide – the particular woman’s right to religious 
expression vs. any (other) women’s right to gender equality.   
 
As far as “judicial approaches” to gender equality go, I am thus in favour of approaches 
which abstain from efforts to balance “fundamentally opposing” values where no such 
opposition is claimed. I am also much in favour of gender equality laws which makes no 
exception to its own basic principle. When the state grants general exemption rights from anti 
discrimination legislation to religious communities, it has unilaterally sided with the 
“majorities within”, and formally imposed on gender equality a duty to yield. 
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i. In the original text, the stipulation concerning state religion, was accompanied by the following 
religiously defined expulsions: Jesuits and monastic orders were not to be tolerated, and Jews were not 
granted permission to access the country at all. See Bergem, Karlsen and Slydal, 2002. The state religion is 
accompanied by a state church, a Christian intention clause for public schools and kinder gardens, and a 
compulsory education program in the subject (“teaching of”:) Christianity, Religion and Life Stances This 
compulsory program was found in breach of the Convention on Civil and Political Rights by the UN 
Human Rights Committee in Geneva in November 2004. In January 2006, a government appointed 
committee delivered its recommendations on the abolishment of the constitutionally anchored state religion 
and the development of a new legal framework for the Church of Norway . 
  
ii The Human Rights Act incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights, the covenants on civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
  
iii Nussbaum 1999:111. The alteration of this approach in a US Supreme Court decision made in 1990 is a 
major theme in Nussbaum’s discussion. The new ruling stated that a neutral (non-discriminatory) law does 
not conflict with the protection of the right to religious freedom ascertained in the constitution even if the 
state hardly could be considered to hold a “compelling interest”. The issue concerned whether the use of a 
narcotic substance during a religious ceremony could claim exception from a general legal ban.  
ivQuoted from the internet version; www.samtiden.no/03-3/art4.html, s.2. 
 
v Letter from the Bishopric of Oslo, dated 7.Feb. 2000. 
vi Cf. The Church of Norway National Council’s memorandum dated 27.Jan. 2000. 
vii Letter from the Gender Equality Ombud addressed to church organizations, 22.Nov. 2002. 
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viii Statistics provided by the Equality Ombud’s office  for this article. Statistics should not be interpreted as 
proof of general societal lack of discrimination on these grounds;  the Gender Equality Act does little to 
specify protection against discrimination on combinatory grounds. This issue was strongly raised by 
immigrant women’s organisations during the revision process in 2000-2002. It was rejected by the Ombud 
with reference to the general clause (but – alas – with no reference to the general exemption). Recently 
however, the problem of combined discrimination has provided one of the main arguments for a reform of 
the Ombud institution: A new agency was established in 2006, to oversee both the Gender Equality Act and 
the new law against discrimination on ethnic and religious grounds.   
 
ix The first of these were a collection of 14 different complaints, presented by the Norwegian Centre against 
Ethnic Discrimination, the MIRA Centre and the Islamic Women’s Group. Those cases which were 
actually possible to investigate resulted in a decision by the Ombud that the prohibition was in violation of 
the Gender Equality Act (Mile 2004:222-223) 
x  Dahlab v. Switzerland is from2001, decision on admissibility – found non admissable and Sahin v. 
Turkey from 2004.  Titia Leonen (2004)  discusses the main ”pro-con” arguments of hijab controversy, and 
also make note of the German constitutional court’s contrary decision on a teacher’s complaint from 2003.  
The Sahin v. Turkey decision was upheld in a Grand Chamber ruling in November 2005.  
xi Note that this approach differs on several accounts from the decision by the Danish Supreme Court in the 
”Føtex case” about religious discrimination, from January 2005. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the 
store chain s uniform code, which prohibited  any type of head covering and, more generally, all forms of 
religious and political symbols.   
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